A Commentary by Jai Krishna Ponnappan: Russia

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Will Russia Remain A Superpower?

Another facet of Russia's ontological security is its imperial expansion's capacity to project authority and meet physical security demands.

The quest of a Russian empire is inextricably linked to its geographical territory and history, just as it is with the powerful state symbolized by a great leader.

Putin said in 2003 that a nation like Russia "was constantly faced with the possibility of disintegration...during all of its periods of weakness." He also said that "if Russia remains a major power, it can live and expand within current boundaries" (Putin 2003).

As a consequence, an imperial physical area and Russian self-perception as a great power are linked, with territorial vastness serving as proof of moral size and might (Leichtova 2014).

When the Russian philosopher Konstantin Leontiev (quoted in Trenin 2002, 29) said that Russia was "doomed to develop, even against itself," he was referring to the almost fatalistic perspective of Russia's expansionism.

In Russia's imperial conquest, the economic and geopolitical justifications for its expansionist ambitions have combined.

When it came to dealing with economic threats, the overlap between imperial expansion and peasant colonization was virtually indistinguishable, as the "land hungry peasantry moved into new territories that sometimes predated and sometimes followed the ever-new frontiers of the state, blurred the boundary between colonization and imperialism" (Raeff 1971, 22–43).

As a result, the country's expansionism was a method of ensuring that Russia's peasants had access to better land and that the Russian populace had the resources it needed to survive.

Imperial expansion occurred in reaction to Russia's physical threats, much as the consolidation of power in a powerful state outlined earlier.

Russia's geographical expansion was prompted by threats to its security and physical existence (Trenin 2002, 33).

The Russian state's choice to become an empire was a response to its near-constant state of war, since Russia "was attacked more often and with more power than any other early modern empire" (Tsygankov 2012, 23).

As a result, the logic of competition, motivated by the will to live, pushed Russia to fight war and extend its territory.

Russians had to choose between dying or confronting their enemies with force and then developing the conquered areas to their advantage.

As a result, the strengthening of boundaries provided fertile ground for colonization.

Furthermore, Russian security was predisposed to expand outside in order to avoid foreign threats.

Vernadsky (1963) ascribed imperial Russia's development to interactions with Eastern tribes, particularly the Mongols.

Kliuchevskii (1937) viewed the colonization of the Eurasian plain and the creation of the Principality of Moscovy to be the most significant events in Russian imperial history, alongside Vernadsky.

Russia managed to grow at a pace of around 50 miles per day for hundreds of years, ultimately spanning one-sixth of the earth's territory, beginning with the formation of the state of Moscovy under Ivan Grozny (Kotkin 2016, 2).

The essential feature of Russian imperial growth was not just its size, but also its scope.

Pipes (1996) claims that the Russian Empire is ontologically distinct from other empires that have existed in the past.

While imperial growth proceeded chronologically following the creation of the national state in other Western empires, such as the Roman, British, and Spanish, it happened simultaneously and not in order in Russia (Pipes 1996).

As a result, the ontological awareness of an empire and the notion of a country coexisted in Russia.

The early imperial expansion to the east began in the 16th century, when Ivan the Terrible took the Tatar city of Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan a few years later in 1556, and included the enormous number of people who did not share the Russians' faith or language.

This conquest occurred barely a few decades after Russia had completed its own consolidation as a state by collecting Russian territory.

This was a deliberate attempt by Moscovy to acquire adjacent areas.

Within 200 years, Moscow's monarchy expanded its geographic realm by annexing or seizing the territory of fragmented Slavic kingdoms by military force or other means.

Pskov and Ryazan were absorbed in 1510 and 1521, respectively, to complete the process.

Moskovy was therefore still undergoing internal consolidation when, a few decades later, it received the imperial dominion of two khanates.

As a result, its imperial conquest coincided with the establishment of the Russian state and the creation of its ontological understanding.

As a consequence, unlike other states, Russia's imperial sphere is inextricably linked to its own existence as a state and its ontological understanding.

In one of his review pieces, Hosking expresses this idea succinctly: "Britain had an empire, but Russia was an empire, and maybe still is" (Hosking 1995, 27).

Russia's advance into Siberia started with the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, annexing a substantial Muslim population and transforming Russia into a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state.

That a result, Russia developed an imperial identity at the same time as it developed a national identity.

The ongoing process of defining and establishing an empire, as well as Russia's urge to acquire new territory and peoples, left the foundation of Russia as a state and a country in a state of flux, ultimately leading to a feeling of incompleteness.

As a consequence of Russia's expansionist goals, a plethora of ethnic groups with separate languages, cultural traditions, and religious beliefs were annexed to the country, further complicating the notion of Russian nationality.

Russia's high sensitivity to any difficulties connected to its geographic impact may be explained by the significance of imperial identity for the country's ontological security, since these issues seem to assault the country's fundamental heart as a state.

Russian rulers such as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great further integrated and structured imperial ideologies into purposeful rhetorical creations.

Peter saw imperial rhetoric as largely directed towards Russia's external neighbors, notably the West.

He made an effort to reaffirm Russia's position in the area.

Catherine the Great, on the other hand, stressed Russia's size as a formidable empire and a weapon for ensuring the safety and well-being of its residents as well as international stability (Leichtova 2014).

These critical episodes of Russian territorial expansion and consolidation, motivated by physical security concerns, had a significant influence on Russia's ontological security.

The country's outward imperial expansion was matched by an internal consolidation of power that became a defining feature of the Russian state, as Vujai describes it: "a twofold triumph...over his own people and ethnically and religiously alien people - the leitmotif of imperial Russian history" (2015, 100).

As a result, the evolution of Russia into an empire was inextricably linked from the start to the patrimonial ruler's subjection of all socioeconomic strata.

Despite their subjection, the Russian people have a thorough understanding of imperial ontological consciousness.

In his book The End of Eurasia, Trenin (2002) believes that Russians' ontological understanding of the nation as a major power is crucial.

When Putin was elected president in 1999, a survey of Moscow high school students found that more than half of those polled supported the restoration of the Russian Empire within its Soviet-era or pre-revolutionary boundaries.

The yearning among Russian young for territorial revanchism is frightening and readily explained.

For many Russians, the old Soviet Union was more than simply an empire; it was a state with a large geographic footprint that "was feared and hence admired," highlighting the clear ontological link between territory and power in Russian identity (Trenin 2002, 27).

Ontological perceptions of Russian identity, on the other hand, are not static.

They are always changing and reiterating.

Physical space has also played a factor in Russians' perceptions of their country's superpower status.

When asked, "What makes a nation a superpower?" the size of the country was nearly as important to Russians as respect and authority in the world, and it had tripled in significance since 1999, surpassing civil rights as a primary aim (Levada Center 2014).

~ Jai Krishna Ponnappan

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Russia And The West's Role In The New World Order.

The substance of great power rhetoric is likewise embedded in Russian ontological security via relations with the West.

For millennia, Russia's ontological consciousness has been influenced by its geographic closeness to European states, as well as their economic and geopolitical significance.

To begin with, the West has had a significant influence on the substance of Russian identity.

The West has always functioned as Russia's Other, a yardstick for assessing and measuring the country's uniqueness (Leichtova 2014, 28).

Russian and Western philosophy and culture seem to be fundamentally different from one another.

Through the work of Russian philosophers, historians, and intellectuals such as Tolstoy (1828–1910), Kireevskiy (1806–1856), Leontiev (1831–1891), and others, such a distinction has been historically established.

Unlike Western culture, Russian culture emphasizes "synthesis over analysis, idealism over pragmatism, imagery over logic, intuition over reason, and the shared over the private" (Surkov 2006).

As a result, the disparity between Russian and Western perspectives seems to be fundamentally irreconcilable.

Furthermore, among Westernizers, Slavophiles, and Eurasianists, the dispute over the West's effect on Russian identity has been at the heart of the country's biographical narrative.

Westernizers emphasize Russia's similarities to the West and see the West as the world's most viable and advancing civilisation ("Westernizers" 2013).

The origins of this school may be traced back to the reforms of Peter the Great.

Some scholars, however, suggest that Russia's profound cultural ties to the West started when it converted to Orthodoxy and became a student of the Byzantine religion (Tsygankov 2012, 3).

Russia's "important Other" has always been Europe, which has figured significantly in internal disputes.

Russia's authorities maintained their essential ideals in a situation imposed by the West.

Russians, according to Westernizers, have always been an important part of the Western cultural mainstream (Prizel 1998, 160).

There is no one book that summarizes the Westernizers' viewpoints.

Despite their differing viewpoints, their sociopolitical, philosophical, and historical perspectives shared a number of characteristics.

They were all against autocracy and serfdom.

They were dedicated to assisting Russia's transition to a capitalist society; they denounced serfdom, made plans for its eradication, and campaigned for the benefits of hired labor.

Slavophilism arose as a school of thought in the 19th century as a reaction against Westernism (Tuminez 2000, 63).

Slavophiles, unlike Westernizers, considered Russia as a unique civilisation that combined the values of Orthodoxy, Slavic ethnicity, and community institutions.

They believed in Russia's Messianic character, which was called to heal both internal social divides and the spiritual wounds of Europe, which had been torn by revolution and war, by the force of its example (Billington 2004, 13).

All of human history, Slavophiles believed, was a fight between spiritual and material forces.

In general, they maintained that religion and family, as well as the spiritual institutions of rural Russia, were important to Russian identity and destiny.

Because it was predicated on mutual confidence between the sovereign and his people, Slavophiles embraced autocracy as the proper manifestation of Russian political authority.

Panslavism originated as an outward projection of Slavophile views as a consequence of Russia's loss in the Crimean War in 1856 and the humiliation that the Russian aristocracy felt as a result of what they saw as European powers' treachery.

In a nutshell, Panslavism pushed for Slavic union, with Russia serving as the intellectual and political core.

Panslavs crafted their image in opposition to "the Other," which included the collective West and stronger European powers.

In the background of the Crimean War, Danilevskii (1869), whose book on Russia and Europe became a symbol of Panslavism, argued about Europe's inherent animosity against Russia.

He said that Europe's attitude was the result of a deep-seated hostility between Roman Catholic European civilisation and the rest of the globe, rather than military concerns (including Slavs).

Danilevskii compared various civilizations to "live beings," implying that conflict between them is as inevitable as conflict between living organisms.

Other well-known Russian philosophers, such as Herzen and Bakunin, regarded the West as the embodiment of a logical and cold Gesellschaft, in contrast to Russia's organic Gemeinschaft.

Their rejection was motivated not only by a dislike of the West's bourgeois path, but also by the belief that Russia's backward people may one day become a source of supremacy for the country.

Eurasianism or Civilizationism, like Panslavism, portrays Russian ontological consciousness as distinct from that of the West.

The core of this movement was its appreciation of Russia's distinctiveness.

Russia, according to Eurasianists, was more of a culture with a distinct ontological understanding than a country.

They maintained that Russia's geographic, linguistic, and historical context reflect its distinctiveness (Savitskii 2003, 653–699).

Their slogan, as expressed by Savitskii (2003), was based on equating any nation to the individuality of a single person.

As a result, the Russian country must strive to be like itself, with its own sense of ontological awareness and biographic continuity, rather than aim to be like others.

One of the important elements of Russian identity, according to Eurasianists, is a large concentration of centralized authority.

They maintained that Russia inherited such a type of state creation from previous nomadic empires, and that everything in Russia must be done in the name of the state, particularly its ruler.

As a result, Eurasianists place a high value on statism and consider it as the bedrock of Russian history.

West Eurasianists, in their opinion, are primarily doubtful of its significance for Russia's future.

They claim that, despite the West's political and cultural strength, Russia's incorporation into Europe has always been accompanied by a feeling of inferiority.

Russia was seen as a European peripheral, despised by Europe because of its technological backwardness.

This lack of acknowledgment of Russia as an equal among Western European countries plays a significant role in the formation of the Russian biographical narrative and the ontological understanding of the nation.

It is not enough for a state's leadership to conceive of themselves as great in order to be a great power.

When other states in the system, particularly other great powers or members of powerful clubs of powers, see the status seeker as a great power, the attribution of status happens.

Because of Russia's closeness to strong European powers, their acceptance of its position was critical for the external validation of Russia's self-perception as a great power.

Domestically, such acknowledgment boosts collective self-esteem and solidifies public support for developmental objectives.

Great power status implies influence over other states in the system and, as a result, may improve a state's physical security.

One of the key motivations for Peter the Great's imperial expansion was the outward projection of authority to the Western nations.

Russia has affected Europe throughout history.

However, Russia was seldom ever treated as an equal in the international system.

Europeans, on the other hand, saw Russia as a primitive, even barbarous civilization with an oppressive governmental structure.

For many of Europe, Russia was the antimodel, the polar opposite of what an educated society should be, as the Marquis de Custine observed: "If your sons should ever be dissatisfied with France, try my recipe; tell them to travel to Russia." Every foreigner will benefit from the journey: those who have thoroughly investigated the nation will be satisfied to live elsewhere (cited in Stent 2007, 404).

For a long time, Russia's self-referential premise of seeing itself as a great power has been prevalent in Russian identity politics.

The theme's endurance, as well as its prominence in Russian identity politics, leads one to believe that Russia's ambition for great power status has failed.

Success, according to Neumann (2008), would imply that the great power narrative has become a component of the political discourse rather than its content.

Other great powers, which traditionally for Russia have been the European nations, have to acknowledge Russia's great power position.

This lack of acknowledgment is said to have contributed to ontological worry over Russia's great power position in the biographical narrative.

Another crucial facet of the West's participation in Russian ontological security is the West's devotion to the Russian-Western confrontation.

Mitzen and Roe underline the relevance of the relational component in the formation of a state's ontological security, as previously stated.

They claim that ontological security, anchored in established routines, enables predictability and anxiety avoidance in international interactions.

As a result, the internal and international routines that governments have created may lead them to participate in a tough war again.

Even routines that are perilous for survival may produce a feeling of ontological security and assist security seekers who are tied to the conflict justification in making decisions (Roe 2000; Mitzen 2006, 341).

Andrei Tsygankov observed three main trajectories in Russia's ties with the West in his book, Russia with the West from Alexander to Putin: Cooperation, Defensiveness, and Assertiveness.

He emphasized this.

Throughout the years, Russia's use of assertiveness has been ingrained in the country's ontological security (Tsygankov 2012, 262).

Historically, Russia has been engaged in the majority of its armed battles with its Western neighbors (wars with Poland in the 17th century; Sweden in the 18th century; the Napoleonic War and the Crimean War in the 19th century; Germany in World War I and again in the Great Patriotic War; and the Cold War).

After the Cold War ended, these tense relationships became even more entrenched.

Western countries have contributed to the escalation of tensions (Trenin 2002; Kanet 2007; Mankoff 2009; Tsygankov 2012, and others).

One explanation for this is the West's assumption that it vanquished the erstwhile Soviet Union during the Cold War (Razyvayev 1992).

Furthermore, due to the West's judgement that Russia's progress in economic reform and performance was insufficient, economic help promised to Russia was not provided.

Internally, however, Russia was seen as a former Great Power that had been reduced to begging the West for handouts and submitting to the dictates of the International Monetary Fund.

One of the main issues in the restoration of present Russian identity in the context of the country's ties with the West has been humiliation.

It has been bolstered by a prevailing narrative of the West's deeply ingrained distrust of Russia.

Russia is seen in the West as inherently expansionist and imperialist.

The notion of "sovereign democracy" as a comprehensive philosophy aimed to improve sociopolitical cohesiveness inside the nation became a powerful embodiment of this narrative.

Its basic thesis is that democracy is a perception, and that it would reflect the demands of various governments at different periods in different ways.

More importantly, these requirements are anchored in each country's ontological knowledge as a result of historical legacies and geopolitical circumstances, removing the West's monopoly on democracy.

The contemporary Russian biographical story rhetoric of great power, according to Fleming Hansen, consolidates the state around Russia's historic values and customs.

In the framework of the country's opposition to the West (Hansen 2016, 359–375), they are created.

While part of the dialogue has been politically orchestrated and skilfully controlled, it is still based on Russian perspectives.

These historically ingrained ideas have formed a significant component of Russian identity, self-perception, and worldview.

As a result, Russian citizens' attachment to the Western war gives a sense of comfort and regularity.

Ironically, as ontological security argues, confrontation with the West provides the Russian populace with internal identity coherence and biographical continuity.

These worries have been employed by Russian elites to consolidate power in the face of foreign pressures and economic obstacles in the modern era.

Despite the fact that Russia's "othering" of the West after the fall of the Soviet Union was deeply established, the Kremlin aimed to disrupt the ontological narrative's continuity.

Then, under the leadership of President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev, a new Russian state achieved one of its most important goals: ending Russia's decades of isolation from the West (Kanet and Birgerson 1997).

The emphasis was on the desire for Russia to abandon its Messianic ideology and become a "normal power" in the West-constructed international system (Tsygankov 2016).

As a consequence, there was a significant break in Russian biographical continuity, shown in efforts to decentralize the Russian state's authority, abandoning its messianic and imperial ideology in favor of the goal to become a "normal power." As a result, the geopolitical attention changed away from Russia's near abroad and Muslim and Asian nations, and toward Western international institutions and Western governments, particularly the United States and European countries.

The romance with the West, however, did not endure long.

Furthermore, the international system's power balance had shifted, leaving the United States as the undisputed hegemon.

The United States and other Western nations have taken a series of moves that have caused Moscow to protest that the West has a propensity to impose its own terms in the international arena.

Russia was asked to join the West, but the door was only half-opened (Trenin 2006).

As a result, the Russian integration initiative into Western institutions was halted at the point of interception.

There are a plethora of instances of shoddy integration.

While other former Warsaw Pact nations were being pulled into NATO, Russia was given new arrangements but maintained at a distance.

Furthermore, NATO's military troops have been stationed near to Russian borders throughout time.

When Georgia and Ukraine indicated interest in joining the group, it heightened Russia's feeling of strategic insecurity.

Despite the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, NATO security systems remained impenetrable as they grew larger and deeper, preventing Russia from joining the security community as a full member (Sakwa 2015).

Soft power programs established by the European Union in Russia's near abroad, such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), were particularly disturbing for Russia (Akchurina and Della Sala 2018).

The Kremlin views the series of color revolutions as a blatant and forceful incursion by the United States on the country's traditional domains of interest.

This instilled in Russian culture a widespread sense of Western deception, which was very harmful to the West's image.

As a result, rather than rupturing, ontological knowledge became even more concentrated around the country's biographic signifiers of anti-Western hostility.